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Abstract
We study the behavior of stochastic bandits algorithms under strategic behavior
conducted by rational actors, i.e., the arms. Each arm is a strategic player who
can modify its own reward whenever pulled, subject to a cross-period budget
constraint. Each arm is self-interested and seeks to maximize its own expected
number of times of being pulled over a decision horizon. Strategic manipulations
naturally arise in various economic applications, e.g., recommendation systems
such as Yelp and Amazon. We analyze the robustness of three popular bandit
algorithms: UCB, ε-Greedy, and Thompson Sampling. We prove that all three
algorithms achieve a regret upper bound O(max{B, lnT }) under any (possibly
adaptive) strategy of the strategic arms, where B is the total budget across arms.
Moreover, we prove that our regret upper bound is tight. Our results illustrate the
intrinsic robustness of bandits algorithms against strategic manipulation so long as
B = o(T ). This is in sharp contrast to the more pessimistic model of adversarial
attacks where an attack budget ofO(ln T ) can trick UCB and ε-Greedy to pull the
optimal arm only o(T ) number of times. Our results hold for both bounded and
unbounded rewards.
1 Introduction
Nowadays multi-armed bandits (MAB) play a significant role across the digital economy, for on-
line/display advertising [9, 13], search engines [17] and online recommendation systems [18], to
name a few. Classical stochastic multi-armed bandit models assume that the feedback (reward or
loss) of each arm is drawn from a fixed distribution. However, in many economic applications, an
armmay be strategic and able to modulate its own reward feedback to the learner in order to increase
its own number of times of being selected. For example, restaurants are known to offer discounts or
free dishes in order to entice customers to return; online stores on Amazon may offer discounts or
coupons to potential buyers in order to receive higher ratings and thus increase its ranking.
To facilitate our description, we will distinguish the two different parties in our strategic setting: the
principal agent (or principal for short) and arms. The principal represents a multi-armed bandit
algorithm (e.g., UCB or Thompson Sampling) run by some system (e.g., the Amazon platform)
whereas the arms represent all the parties who generate reward feedbacks to the principal (e.g. online
stores on Amazon). As is typical in stochastic bandits, the true reward of each arm is drawn from an
underlying distribution. However, we assume that each arm i is a strategic agent and can increase its
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own reward revealed to the principal, but with a cross-period total budget Bi for the manipulation.
All arms are self-interested, equipped with a natural objective of maximizing its expected number
of times being pulled. Each arm can only modify its own reward at the time it is pulled, but has no
control over the rewards of other arms. The strategy of each arm can be adaptive— i.e., the amount
by which it changes the current reward can depend on the history. Since arms’ strategies affect each
other, this dynamic interaction forms a strategic game among arms, more precisely, a stochastic
game. Our study is motivated by various economic applications of MAB, where we believe strategic
manipulations appear more realistic than the pessimistic consideration of adversarial attacks [16, 19]
(see more illustrations in Section 2). The central question we study in this paper is the following:
Are existing stochastic bandit algorithms robust to arms’ strategic manipulations?
Quantitatively, can we characterize their regret bounds?
Our results and contributions. Our main results illustrate that the three popular stochastic ban-
dits algorithms — i.e., Upper Confidence Bound (UCB), ǫ-Greedy and Thompson Sampling — are
essentially all robust to strategic manipulations.
Concretely, we prove that under any (possibly adaptive) strategic manipulations of the arms, the
regret of all three algorithms is upper bounded by O(∑i6=i∗ max{Bi, lnT }), where i∗ indexes the
optimal arm.1 Moreover, we prove that this regret upper bound is tight by exhibiting a simple and
natural manipulation strategy which results in a regret of the same order in all three algorithms. The
regrets here are with respect to the underlying true rewards, and they hold for both bounded and
unbounded rewards. This shows that performances of all these algorithms deteriorate linearly in the
summed budget B =
∑
i6=i∗ Bi. As long as B = o(T ), the optimal arm will be pulled for T − o(T )
times. Our simulation results also validate such linear dependence on B. This is in sharp contrast to
the situation of adversarial attacks where an attack budget of O(ln T ) can trick UCB and ε-Greedy
to pull the optimal arm only o(T ) number of times, resulting in regret Ω(T ) [16]. We remark that
such contrasting performances in adversarial vs strategic settings has been observed in other fields
such as Cryptography [14]. However, to the best of our knowledge, this appears to be the first such
example in stochastic bandits.
From the technical viewpoint, our setting strictly generalizes the standard stochastic bandits (corre-
sponding to Bi = 0 for all arm i’s), therefore the proofs also have to generalize previous techniques
for proving regret bounds. To do so, we devise new ways to bound the expected number of times
that an arm is pulled, which may be of independent interest.
Additional related work. Most relevant to ours are the two recent works on adversarial attacks
to stochastic bandits [16, 19]. Jun et al. [16] design attack strategies that only use O(lnT ) attack
budget and can trick an UCB and ε-Greedy principal to pull the optimal arm only o(T ) number of
times. The key difference between our model and the adversarial attack in [16] (as well as [19])
is that the adversary there can modify any arm’s rewards (crucially, can decrease the optimal arm’s
rewards) whereas in our setting each arm can only increase its own rewards due to our strategic
behavior assumption. This is the fundamental reason of the contrasting results in these two mod-
els.2 Moreover, [16] only studies UCB and ε-Greedy with unbounded rewards. Efficient attacks
for bounded rewards and for Thompson Sampling are left as open problems in [16]. However, our
regret bound holds also for Thompson sampling and bounded rewards. Lykouris et al. [19] consider
a complementary question: can we design a stochastic bandit algorithm that is robust to adversarial
corruptions? They answer the question in the affirmative by designing a new algorithm whose per-
formance deteriorates also linearly in the amount of adversarial corruptions but with an additional
lnT multiplicative factor. In contrast, our goal is to prove the robustness of existing stochastic ban-
dits algorithms to strategic manipulations. Moreover, our regret bound is linear in B without the
additional lnT factor. This is possible due to again the aforementioned model difference.
1Here to state regret bounds concisely, we treated K and other bandit parameters (e.g. ∆i and σ) as con-
stants.
2Indeed, since our regret bound happens to be linear in B =
∑
i6=i∗ Bi, if all arms’ budgets are not
endogenously given and instead controlled by a meta adversary who can only use this budget to modify non-
optimal arms’ rewards, our regret bounds still hold. This would not have been true if the regret bound was
nonlinear in Bi’s.
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Our work belongs to the general research field of no-regret learning with strategic agents. Much
of this literature focused on designing no-regret learning algorithms under agents’ strategic behav-
iors and studied problems arising from concrete applications such as auctions [5, 22, 11, 12] and
recommendation systems [20, 15]. However, the strategic agents in these models do not correspond
to arms, but are the agents who pull the arms or a mechanism (e.g., an auction) which generates
rewards. To our knowledge, Braverman et al. [6] are the first to consider strategic behaviors of arms
in stochastic bandit settings. In their model, when an arm is pulled, it receives a private reward v and
strategically chooses an amount x to pass to the principal, leaving the remaining amount of v − x
to the arm itself. Motivated by a completely different set of applications, our model considers strate-
gic arms that seek to maximize the expected number of plays by manipulating its rewards under a
budget.
2 The Model: Strategic Manipulations in Stochastic Bandits
Basic setup. We consider a natural strategic variant of the stochastic multi-armed bandit setting.
There areK arms, denoted by set [K] = {1, 2, ...,K}. The reward of each arm i ∈ [K] follows a σ-
sub-Gaussian distribution (see DefinitionA.1 in Appendix)with mean µi, whereσ is publicly known.
For ease of presentation, we mainly work with unbounded rewards throughout the paper unless
otherwise specified. However, we show in Section 5.1 that all our analysis and results generalize to
bounded rewards. Let i∗ = argmaxi∈[K] µi denote the unique arm (WLOG) with maximum mean,
∆i = µi∗ − µi > 0 denote the difference of the reward mean between the optimal arm i∗ and arm
i( 6= i∗), and∆ := mini6=i∗ ∆i.
We will distinguish the two different parties in our strategic setting: the principal agent (or principal
for short) and arms. In particular, the principal represents a bandit algorithm (e.g., UCB or ε-greedy
or Thompson Sampling). At each time t = 1, · · · , T , the principal pulls arm It which generates
a reward rt. Here T is some fixed time horizon. Let ni(t) =
∑t
τ=1 I(It = i) denote the number
of times that arm i has been pulled up to (including) time t and µ̂i(t) =
1
ni(t)
∑t
τ=1 rτ · I(Iτ = i)
denote the average rewards obtained from pulling arm i up to (including) time t.
Strategic arms. Different from classic stochastic bandits, each arm i ∈ [K] in our setting is a
strategic actor, equipped with the natural objective of maximizing E[ni(T )], i.e., the expected total
number of times arm i is pulled. The actions available to arm i is to modify its own rewards when
it is pulled under a total budget Bi. Concretely, when It = i, arm i can add an additional reward
amount α
(i)
t to the realized reward rt — subject to the budget constraint
∑T
t=1 |α(i)t | ≤ Bi — so
that the revealed reward to the principal is r˜t = rt + α
(i)
t . Note that arm i has no control over other
arms’ rewards, i.e., α
(i)
t must equal 0 when It 6= i. To distinguish, we call rt the true award and
r˜t the manipulated award. The principal only knows r˜t but not rt, however her goal is to minimize
regret with respect to the true reward rt (see motivations later). Without loss of generality, we
assume α
(i)
t ≥ 0 since in order to maximize E[ni(T )] arm i should never use a negative α(i)t . We
thus call ~α(i) = (α
(i)
1 , · · · , α(i)T ) an manipulation strategy of arm i. Note that, ~α(i) can be adaptive,
i.e., α
(i)
t can depend on what happens at round τ = 1, · · · , t − 1. As a more convenient notation,
let β
(i)
t =
∑
τ≤t α
(i)
τ denote the total manipulations until time t, which satisfies β
(i)
t−1 ≤ β(i)t and
β
(i)
T ≤ Bi. Note that ~β(i) = (β(i)1 , · · · , β(i)T ) is just an equivalent representation of ~α(i). We call
~β = (~β(1), · · · , ~β(K)) a strategy profile. The objective of any arm i is to find an manipulation
strategy ~β(i) to maximize E[n
~β
i (T )] = E[
∑T
t=1 I(It = i)]. For convenience, we sometimes omit the
superscript ~β when it is clear from the context.
Our main goal is to upper bound the principal’s regret under arms’ strategic manipulations. Note that
all the regrets are with respect to the true reward sequence {rt}, while not {r˜t}. For convenience,
we assume that Bi∗ = 0 and thus ~β
(i∗) is the trivial vector of all zeros. This is without loss of
generality since Bi∗ > 0 would only reduce the regret for any manipulation strategy of the optimal
arm i∗.
Motivations of the strategic model. Here we give one practical motivation of our model but it
shall be easy to see that similar situations happen in many other applications. Consider the recom-
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mendation system Yelp running a stochastic bandit algorithm. The bandits correspond to restaurants
to be recommended and each user access corresponds to a pull of the arms. The true service quality
of each restaurant follows some underlying distribution. However, restaurants are strategic agents,
and one natural objective for them to be on Yelp is to maximize the expected number of times it
gets recommended to users, i.e., E[ni(T )] in our notation. To do so, a widely observed approach
in practice is to provide discounts or coupons to some users (i.e., additional rewards to users), sub-
ject to budget constraints because the restaurants cannot provide arbitrarily many coupons. This
phenomenon is captured precisely by our modeling of arms’ strategic manipulations. The Yelp plat-
form, on the other hand, would like to recommend the restaurants with truly good service and thus
want to minimize the regret with respect to the true reward. In this context, our goal is to understand
how these restaurants’ strategic behaviors affect the platform’s regret.
Solution concept. Since the strategies of these self-interested arms affect each others, their inter-
action induces a strategic game, more precisely, a stochastic game. The standard approach then is
to analyze the principal’s regret at some Nash equilibrium among the strategic arms. However, the
equilibria of stochastic games are extremely difficult to characterize and computationally intractable
(see, e.g., [4, 10] and references therein). We instead consider a stronger benchmark and prove
the robustness of the regret upper bound against arbitrary strategy profiles — regardless whether it
forms a Nash Equilibrium or not. This is the strongest robustness guarantee in this strategic model.
3 UCB and ε−Greedy are Robust to Strategic Manipulations
In this section, we analyze the regret guarantee when the principal agent uses either the Upper
Confidence Bound (UCB) [3] or the ε−Greedy algorithm. It turns out that they admit the same
regret upper bound under strategic manipulations, up to constant factors. Note that our proofs do not
depend on whether the rewards are bounded or unbounded, so the upper bounds hold for both cases.
The full proofs for UCB and ε−Greedy can be found in Appendix B.1 and B.2, respectively.
3.1 UCB Principal
We consider a standard (α, ψ)−UCB with α = 4.5 and ψ : λ → σ2λ22 (thus (ψ∗)−1(ǫ) =
√
2σ2ǫ)
mentioned in [7] and used in [16] as well. Concretely, the algorithm selects each arm once in the
firstK rounds, i.e. It = t, ∀t < K . For t ≥ K ,
It = argmax
i
{
µ̂i(t− 1) + 3σ
√
ln t
ni(t− 1) + I(i 6= i
∗)
β
(i)
t−1
ni(t− 1)
}
,
Recall that the term µ̂i(t− 1) + 3σ
√
ln t
ni(t−1)
is the standard UCB term for any arm i ∈ [K] at time
t, which we refer to as UCBi(t). U˜CBi(t) = UCBi(t) + β
(i)
t−1
/
ni(t − 1) represents the modified
UCB term for the strategic arm i (i 6= i∗) with manipulation strategy ~β(i).
We now prove the upper bound of regret E[R(T )] under an arbitrary manipulation strategy ~β =
(~β(1), · · · , ~β(K)). Our proof technique strictly generalizes the regret analysis for the standard UCB,
which corresponds to the case with no budget for each arm to manipulate.
Fix any manipulation strategy ~β. The regret can be rewritten in the following way:
E[R(T )] =
∑
i6=i∗
∆i · E[n~βi (T )]. (1)
What remains is to bound E[n
~β
i (T )] for each arm i. For notational convenience, we omit the su-
perscript ~β henceforth when it is clear from the context. Lemma 3.1 proves the upper bound of
E[ni(T )] for each arm i. The main result of this section is summarized in Theorem 3.2.
Lemma 3.1. For any manipulation strategy ~β of strategic arms, the expected number of times that
arm i(i 6= i∗) being pulled up to time T if the principal uses UCB, can be bounded as follows,
E[ni(T )] ≤ max
{
3Bi
∆i
,
81σ2 lnT
∆2i
}
+ 1 +
π2
3
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Proof Sketch. The key idea of this proof is to carefully choose a thresholdCi(T ) for ni(t−1) so that
we can have the best trade-off between the two terms in the following decomposition of E[ni(T )]:
E [ni(T )] ≤ 1 + E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i, ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci(T )}
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i, ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T )}
]
.
It turns out that setting Ci(T ) = max
{
81σ2 lnT
∆2
i
, 3Bi∆i
}
gives the best regret bound after bounding
the first term directly byCi(T ) and bounding the second term via the Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality.
Combining Lemma 3.1 and Equation (1) yields a proof of our main theorem in this section.
Theorem 3.2. For any manipulation strategy ~β of strategic arms, the regret of the UCB principal is
bounded by
E[R(T )] ≤
∑
i6=i∗
[
max
{
3Bi,
81σ2 lnT
∆i
}
+
(
1 +
π2
3
)
∆i
]
Theorem 3.2 reveals that the standard UCB algorithm is robust to the strategic manipulations of arms.
If the budget of each arm is bounded byO(ln T ), the regret of the principal agent is still bounded by
O(ln T ). If Bi = Ω(lnT ) for some arm i’s, the regret is upper bounded by O(
∑
i6=i∗ Bi). This is
sublinear in T so long as B =
∑
i6=i∗ Bi = o(T ), which we believe is typically the case in practice.
3.2 ε-Greedy Principal
Different from UCB, the ε-Greedy algorithm involves a random exploration phase, which makes
the analysis more intricate. Like in UCB, we similarly assume that the algorithm pulls arm t when
t ≤ K , i.e., first exploring each arm once. At round t > K , the algorithm selects an arm as follows:
It =

uniformly drawn from [K], w.p. εt (exploration)
argmax
i
{
µ̂i(t− 1) + I(i 6= i∗)
β
(i)
t−1
ni(t− 1)
}
, otherwise (exploitation)
We usually decay εt over time in order to achieve better performance (see, e.g., the guidance in [3]).
Similar to the analysis of UCB, we derive the following regret guarantee for ε-Greedy.
Theorem 3.3. Let ǫt = min{1, cKt }, where constant c = max{20, 36σ
2
∆ }, for any manipulation
strategy ~β of strategic arms, the regret of the ε-Greedy principal is bounded by
E[R(T )] ≤
∑
i6=i∗
[
3Bi +O
(
lnT
∆i
)]
.
4 The Robustness of Thompson Sampling
In this section, we study the performance of Thompson Sampling (TS) [21], another well-known
class of MAB algorithms. TS is widely known to be challenging to analyze — indeed, its regret
bound was proved only recently in [1, 2]. This is because the algorithm does not directly depend on
the empirical mean of each arm, but relies on random samples from the prior distribution centered at
the empirical mean. This sampling process further complicates the analysis of the stochasticity in the
algorithm. Moreover, it is also not clear that whether there exists an effective adversarial attack to TS,
which was left as an open problem in [16]. Nevertheless, we prove that for strategic manipulations,
TS admits the same regret upper bound as UCB and ǫ-Greedy, up to constant factors. These results
serve as an evidence of the intrinsic robustness of stochastic bandits to strategic manipulations,
regardless which no regret learning algorithm is used. All proofs from this section can be found
in Appendix C.
TS employs the Bayesian updating during arm selection [8, 21]. In this paper, we use Gaussian
priors and likelihood to handle the general rewards setting (Beta priors are usually used for binary
reward feedback). Like UCB and ε-Greedy, we also assume that the algorithm pulls each arm once
in the firstK rounds. For t > K , the algorithm selects an arm according to the following procedure:
5
(1) For each i ∈ [K], sample θi(t − 1) from a Gaussian distribution N (µ˜i(t − 1), 1ni(t−1) ),
where µ˜i(t− 1) = µ̂i(t− 1) + β
(i)
t−1
ni(t−1)
· I{i 6= i∗}.
(2) Select arm It = argmaxi θi(t− 1).
To begin with, we adopt some notations from [2]. For each arm k ∈ [K], we denote two thresholds
xk and yk such that µk ≤ xk ≤ yk ≤ µi∗ , let Eµk (t) be the event µ˜k(t − 1) ≤ xk and Eθk(t) be the
event θk(t) ≤ yk. We also denote Ft as the history of plays until time t. Let τk,s be the time step at
which arm k is played for the sth time and pk,t be the probability that pk,t = P(θi∗(t) ≥ yk
∣∣Ft−1).
Lemma 4.1 shows the upper bound of E [ni(T )] under any manipulation strategy ~β when the princi-
pal runs Thompson Sampling. Theorem 4.2 follows from this lemma. Unsurprisingly, the proof of
Lemma 4.1 turns out to be much more involved than that of Lemma 3.1 due to the aforementioned
challenges. Our proof strictly generalizes the analysis in [2] to incorporate each arm’s manipulation.
Lemma 4.1. For any manipulation strategy ~β, the expected number of times of arm i being pulled
up to time T can be bounded as follows:
E[ni(T )] ≤ max
{6Bi
∆i
,
72σ2 lnT
∆2i
}
+O
(
lnT
∆2i
)
. (2)
Proof Sketch. First we can decompose E[ni,T ] as follows,
E[ni,T ] ≤ 1+E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i, E
µ
i (t),E
θ
i (t)
}]
+
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i, E
µ
i (t),E
θ
i (t)
)
+E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i, E
µ
i (t)
}]
(3)
The proof then proceeds by bounding each of the above terms separately. We set xi = µi+
∆i
3 , yi =
µi∗ − ∆i3 . The first term can be bounded by (18 lnT∆2
i
+ 1) using a result of Agrawal and Goyal [2].
The second term can be bounded by
∑T−1
t=K+1 E
[
1
pi,τi∗,s+1
− 1
]
. We then bound each summand by
the following bounds (Lemma C.3 in the Appendix):
E
[
1
pi,τi∗,s+1
− 1
]
≤
{
e11/4σ
2
+ π
2
3 ∀s,
4
T∆2
i
if s ≥ 72 ln(T∆2i )·max{1,σ2}
∆2
i
.
Finally, utilizing a similar technique as in Lemma 3.1, we can bound the third term by
max
{
6Bi
∆i
, 144σ
2 lnT
∆2
i
}
+ 1 (Lemma C.4 in the Appendix).
Theorem 4.2. For any manipulation strategy ~β of strategic arms, the regret of the Thompson Sam-
pling principal can be bounded as
E[R(T )] ≤
∑
i6=i∗
max
{
6Bi,
72σ2 lnT
∆i
}
+O
(
lnT
∆i
)
. (4)
5 Tightness of the Regret Bounds under a Natural Manipulation Strategy
In this section, we prove that the previous regret upper bounds for UCB, ǫ-Greedy and TS are all
tight. Specifically, we consider a specific manipulation strategy and prove that it results in a regret of
at least Ω(
∑
i6=i∗ [Bi − lnT ]) for the principal in all three algorithms. In this manipulation strategy,
each arm simply spends all of its budget at the first time when it is pulled. We thus coin the name
Lump Sum Investing (LSI). Note that LSI is a non-adaptive manipulation strategy, though our regret
upper bound holds even for adaptive strategies.
We remark that our lower bounds hold for arbitrary σ-Gaussian distributions. This differs from
classical regret lower bounds, which are typically distribution-dependent and proved by constructing
a particular class of distributions, i.e., Bernoulli [7]. Our proof also employs different techniques
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which are tailored particularly to achieve tight bounds w.r.t. to manipulation budget Bi’s. We start
with a simple lower bound for the regret E[R(T )] by utilizing Equation (1). That is,
E[R(T )] =
∑
i6=i∗
∆iE[ni(T )] ≥ ∆ ·
∑
i6=i∗
E[ni(T )]. (5)
Next, we focus on lower bounding
∑
i6=i∗ E[n
LSI
i (T )] under the manipulation strategy LSI. For
convenience, we omit the superscript LSI since it is clear that this will be the manipulation strategy
of our focus. The proof proceeds by proving an upper bound for E[ni∗(T )], which then is translated
to a lower bound for
∑
i6=i∗ E[ni(T )]. The following theorems state the regret lower bound of UCB,
ǫ-Greedy and Thompson Sampling, respectively. The proofs are in Appendix D.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the principal uses UCB and each strategic arm uses LSI. For any σ-
Gaussian reward distributions, the regret of the principal satisfies
E[R(T )] ≥ ∆
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
−O
(
lnT
∆
)
Theorem 5.2. Suppose the principal uses ǫ-Greedy with ǫt = min{1, cKt }, ∀t > K where c =
max
{
20, 16σ
2
∆
}
, and each strategic arm uses LSI. For any σ-Gaussian reward distributions, the
regret of the principal satisfies
E [R(T )] ≥ ∆
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
−O
(
lnT
∆
)
.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose the principal uses Thompson Sampling and each strategic arm uses LSI.
For any σ-Gaussian reward distributions, the regret of the principal satisfies,
E[R(T )] ≥ ∆
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
−O
(
lnT
∆
)
Remarks: The above lower bounds hold for arbitrary σ-Gaussian distributions, however they can be
easily converted to a distribution-dependent lower boundmax
{
∆
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
−O( lnT∆ ), Ω (lnT )}
because there exist distributions such that any no-regret learning algorithmwill suffer regretΩ (lnT )
[7] and the manipulation strategy LSI of non-optimal arms will not increase this regret. Therefore,
the distribution-dependent lower bound for all three algorithms can be written as Ω
(
max{B −
lnT, lnT }), which precisely matches the order of the upper boundO(max{B, lnT }).
5.1 Generalization to Bounded Rewards
In many applications, such as customers’ rating in Yelp/Amazon, the reward signal is bounded and
the bounds are common knowledge (e.g. 0 ∼ 5 stars rating). Without loss of generality, we assume
that the reward is bounded within [0, 1]. In such settings, the LSI manipulation strategy may be
infeasible since the strategic arm can only manipulate the reward to the upper bound at each time.
We thus use the following natural variant of LSI tailored for bounded rewards: each strategic arm i
spends the budget to promote the observed reward to 1 when it is pulled, until it runs out of all the
budget Bi, and term this strategy LSI for Bounded Rewards or LSIBR for short.
To prove lower bounds for bounded reward settings, we provide a unified reduction from any lower
bound under LSI to a lower bounder under LSIBR, with an additional Θ(lnT ) loss in the lower
bound. Our reduction works for any no-regret learning algorithm, and thus yields the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose rewards are bounded within [0, 1] and all strategic arms uses LSIBR. For a
principal running UCB, ǫ-Greedy or Thompson Sampling, the regret satisfies
E [R(T )] ≥ ∆
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
−O
(
lnT
∆
+
∆ lnT
(1− µi∗)2
)
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Figure 1: Plots of regret as a function of ln t for UCB principal (left), ε-Greedy principal (middle), and Thomp-
son Sampling principal (right), as B1 and B2 vary. We set B3 = 0 for all the three algorithms.
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Figure 2: Plots of regret as a function of total budget B of strategic arms (arm 1 and 2) for UCB principal (left),
ε-Greedy principal (middle), and Thompson Sampling principal (right), as B1, B2 and B3 vary.
6 Simulations
In this section, we run simulations to validate our theoretical results. For space limit, we only report
simulation results for the unbounded reward setting. The results for bounded reward setting are
similar, and can be found in Appendix E.
Setup. There are 3 different arms, the reward distribution of arm 1, arm 2 and arm 3 areN (µ1, σ2),
N (µ2, σ2) and N (µ3, σ2). We assume that µ1 < µ2 < µ3, i.e. arm 3 is the optimal arm. In
ε-Greedy algorithm, we set εt = min{1, 4t }. Throughout the simulations, we fix µ1 = 5, µ2 = 8,
µ3 = 10 and σ = 1. All the arms use LSI strategy. We run bandit algorithms for 10
4 rounds, which
forms one trial. We repeat 100 trials and only report the average results over 100 trials.
Regret of principal with different budgets. We consider the regret for three stochastic bandit
algorithms (UCB, ε-Greedy and Thompson Sampling) with different budgets among strategic arms.
For each algorithm, arm 1 and arm 2 have the same budget Bi, chosen from {0, 10, 100}. We show
the regert as a function of ln t in Figure 1. We observe that for small budgets (i.e., Bi = 0, 10), the
Θ(ln t) term dominates the regret whereas for large budget, the budget term Bi gradually dominates
the regret as t becomes large. This is why we see a turning point in the green lines, at which the plot
transitions to a relatively flat curve (since Bi = 100 is fixed). Interestingly, we find that Thompson
sampling performs better than both UCB and ε-Greedy in this strategic manipulation scenario.
Regret is linear with total budget. We validate that the regret achieved by each stochastic bandit
algorithm with strategic manipulations is linear in the total budget of the strategic arms. We consider
three settings: (1) B1 = B2 = B/2, B3 = 0, (2) B1 = B,B2 = B3 = 0, and (3) B1 = B1 =
B3 = B/2. For setting (1), we uniformly partition the budget to arm 1 and arm 2. For setting (2),
we put all the budget to arm 1. For setting (3), the optimal arm also has budget to manipulate its
reward, and we assume arm 3 also uses strategy LSI. Figure 2 shows the regret at the end of 104
round achieved by three algorithms as the total budget B = B1 +B2 varies. We find that the regret
is indeed linear with total budget in general, which validates our theoretical findings. Interestingly,
even if the optimal arm also has budget to change its reward, the regret still becomes worse as the
budget for arm 1 and 2 increase. In fact, the green line alway stays close to the other two lines where
arm 3 does not have any budget. This is because the optimal arm will be pulled for many times.
Therefore, its budget will be “diluted” significantly in later rounds and thus does not affect the regret
much.
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7 Conclusion and Further Work
In this paper, we study the effects of strategic manipulations on three popular stochastic MAB algo-
rithms: UCB, ε-Greedy and Thompson sampling. We prove that the regrets they suffer under any
strategic manipulations of arms in our model are all upper bounded by O(max{B, lnT }) where B
is the summed budgets across arms. Moreover, this bound is tight under a simple manipulation strat-
egy. For future work, one direction is to understand the equilibrium among arms and see whether it
is possible to achieve sublinear (in summed budget B) regret at equilibrium (recall that our regret
bounds hold for the set of arbitrary strategy profiles). Another interesting direction is to design new
stochastic bandits algorithms that can achieve sublinear (in B) regret bounds in our strategic model.
Finally, as machine learning algorithms are used more and more in the digital economy, it becomes
crucial to understand the performance of learning algorithms in presence of strategic behaviors, and
we hope our study can encourage more related works in this space.
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Appendix
A Useful Definitions and Inequalities
Definition A.1 (σ-sub-Gaussian). A random variable X ∈ R is said to be sub-Gaussian with vari-
ance proxy σ2 if E [X ] = µ and satisfies,
E [exp(s(X − µ))] ≤ exp
(
σ2s2
2
)
, ∀s ∈ R
Note the distribution defined on [0, 1] is a special case of 1/2-sub-Gaussian.
Fact A.2. Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn i.i.d drawn from a σ-sub-Gaussian,X = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi and E[X ] be
the mean, then
P
(
X − E[X ] ≥ a) ≤ e−na2/2σ2 and P (X − E[X ] ≤ −a) ≤ e−na2/2σ2
Fact A.3 (Harmonic Sequence Bound). For t2 > t1 ≥ 2, we have
ln
t2
t1
≤
t2∑
t=t1
1
t
≤ ln
(
t2
t1 − 1
)
Fact A.4. For a Gaussian distributed random variable Z with mean µ and variance σ2, for any z,
P (|Z − µ| > zσ) ≤ 1
2
e−z
2/2
Lemma A.5 (Theorem 3 in [3]). In ε-Greedy, for any arm k ∈ [K], t > K, n ∈ N+, we have
P
(
µ̂k(t− 1) ≤ µk − ∆k
n
)
≤ xt · e−xt/5 + 2σ
2n2
∆2k
e−∆
2
k⌊xt⌋/2σ
2n2 , and
P
(
µ̂i∗(t− 1) ≥ µi∗ + ∆k
n
)
≤ xt · e−xt/5 + 2σ
2n2
∆2k
e−∆
2
k⌊xt⌋/2σ
2n2 ,
where xt =
1
2K
∑t
s=K+1 εs.
B Ommited Proofs in Section 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Let Ci(T ) = max
{
81σ2 lnT
∆2
i
, 3Bi∆i
}
. By Fact A.2, we have for any s ≥ 1 and ℓ ≥ Ci(T )
∀k, P
(
µk − µ̂k(t− 1) ≥ 3σ
√
ln t
nk(t− 1)
∣∣∣nk(t− 1) = s
)
≤ 1
t9/2
P
(
µ̂i(t− 1)− µi ≥ ∆i
3
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = ℓ) ≤ 1
T 9/2
(6)
We first decompose E[ni(T )] as follows,
E [ni(T )] ≤ 1 + E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i, ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci(T )}
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i, ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T )}
]
≤ 1 + Ci(T ) + E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i, ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T )}
]
≤ 1 + Ci(T ) +
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
UCBi(t) +
β
(i)
t−1
ni(t− 1) ≥ UCBi
∗(t), ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T )
)
(7)
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We then bound the probability P
(
UCBi(t) +
β
(i)
t−1
ni(t−1)
≥ UCBi∗(t), ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T )
)
by union
bound, and decompose this probability term as follows,
P
(
UCBi(t) +
β
(i)
t−1
ni(t− 1) ≥ UCBi
∗(t), ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T )
)
≤
t−1∑
s=1
t−1∑
ℓ≥Ci(T )
P
(
UCBi(t) +
β
(i)
t−1
ni(t− 1) ≥ UCBi
∗(t)
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = ℓ, ni∗(t− 1) = s
)
.
(8)
What remains is to upper bound the summand in the above term. Consider for 1 ≤ s ≤ t − 1 and
Ci(T ) ≤ ℓ ≤ t− 1, we have
P
(
UCBi(t) +
β
(i)
t−1
ni(t− 1)
≥ UCBi∗(t)
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = ℓ, ni∗ (t− 1) = s
)
≤ P
(
µ̂i(t− 1) + 3σ
√
ln t
ni(t− 1)
+
∆i
3
≥ µ̂i∗(t− 1) + 3σ
√
ln t
ni∗ (t− 1)
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = ℓ, ni∗ (t− 1) = s)
≤ P
(
µ̂i(t− 1) +
∆i
3
+
∆i
3
≥ µ̂i∗(t− 1) + 3σ
√
ln t
ni∗ (t− 1)
∣∣∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = ℓ, ni∗(t− 1) = s
)
The first inequality relies on the fact that ℓ ≥ Ci(T ) ≥ 3Bi∆i ≥ β
(i)
t−1 and second inequality holds
because ℓ ≥ Ci(T ) ≥ 81σ2 lnT∆2
i
. By union bound and Equation (6), we can further upper bound the
last term in the above inequality by
P
(
µ̂i(t− 1)− µi ≥ ∆i
3
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = ℓ)+ P
(
µi∗ − µ̂i∗(t− 1) ≥ 3σ
√
ln t
ni∗(t− 1)
∣∣∣ni∗(t− 1) = s
)
≤ 1
T 9/2
+
1
t9/2
≤ 2
t9/2
Combining equations (7) and the fact that
T∑
t=K+1
t−1∑
s=1
t−1∑
ℓ≥Ci(T )
2
t9/2
≤
T∑
t=K+1
2
t2
≤ π
2
3
,
we complete the proof.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
To prove this theorem, we instead prove the following Lemma B.1 to bound E[ni(T )] for each arm
i 6= i∗. Given this Lemma, it is then easy to show Theorem 3.3.
Lemma B.1. Suppose the principal runs the ε-Greedy algorithm with εt = min{1, cKt } when
t > K , where the constant c = max
{
20, 36σ
2
∆2
i
}
. Then for any strategic manipulation strategy ~β,
the expected number of times of arm i being pulled up to time T can be bounded by
E [ni(T )] ≤ 3Bi
∆i
+O
(
lnT
∆2i
)
.
Proof. Let Ci =
3Bi
∆i
, xt =
1
2K
∑t
s=K+1 ǫs and for t ≥ ⌊cK⌋+ 1, Given Fact A.3, we have
xt ≥
⌊cK⌋∑
s=K+1
ǫs
2K
+
t∑
t=⌊cK⌋+1
ǫs
2K
≥ ⌊cK⌋ −K + c
2
t∑
s=⌊cK⌋+1
1
s
≥ ⌊cK⌋ −K + c
2
ln
t
⌊cK⌋+ 1 (9)
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We do the decomposition for E[ni(T )] as follows,
E [ni(T )] ≤ 1 + E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i, ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci}
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i, ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci}
]
≤ 1 + Ci +
T∑
t=K+1
ǫt
K
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
(1− ǫt) · I
{
µ˜i(t− 1) ≥ µ̂i∗,t−1, ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci
}]
≤ 1 + Ci +
T∑
t=K+1
ǫt
K
+
T∑
t=⌊cK⌋+1
P
(
µ̂i(t− 1) + βt−1
ni(t− 1) ≥ µ̂i
∗(t− 1), ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci
)
(10)
The last inequality holds because ǫt = 1 when t ≤ ⌊cK⌋ and 1 − ǫt ≤ 1, ∀t. What remains is to
bound the last term above. Since ni(t − 1) ≥ Ci, βt−1 ≤ Bi, ∀t ≤ T , this term is always upper
bounded by
P
(
µ̂i(t− 1) + βt−1
ni(t− 1) ≥ µ̂i
∗(t− 1), ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci
)
≤ P
(
µ̂i(t− 1) + Bi
Ci
≥ µ̂i∗(t− 1)
)
= P
(
µ̂i(t− 1) + ∆i
3
≥ µ̂i∗(t− 1)
)
(11)
By union bound, we have P
(
µ̂i(t−1)+ ∆i3 ≥ µ̂i∗(t−1)
)
≤ P
(
µ̂i(t−1) ≥ µi+ ∆i3
)
+P
(
µ̂i∗(t−
1) ≤ µi∗ − ∆k3
)
. Based on Lemma A.5, we have
P
(
µ̂i(t− 1) + ∆i
3
≥ µ̂i∗(t− 1)
)
≤ 2xt · e−xt/5 + 18σ2∆2
i
e−∆
2
k⌊xt⌋/18σ
2
(12)
We observe the fact that xt ≥ ⌊cK⌋−K + c2 ln t⌊cK⌋+1 > 5. Given xe−x/5 ≤ ye−y/5, ∀x ≥ y ≥ 5
and e−x ≤ e−y, ∀x ≥ y, we have
xte
−xt/5 ≤
(
⌊cK⌋ −K + c2 ln t⌊cK⌋+1
)
e−
c
10 ln
t
⌊cK⌋+1 =
(
⌊cK⌋ −K + c2 ln t⌊cK⌋+1
)
·
(
⌊cK⌋+1
t
)c/10
σ2
∆2
i
e−∆
2
i ⌊xt−1⌋/18σ
2 ≤ σ2
∆2
i
e−∆
2
ic ln
t
⌊cK⌋+1/36σ
2
= σ
2
∆2
i
(
⌊cK⌋+1
t
)c∆2i/36σ2
Combining the above inequalities and Fact A.3, we can bound
T∑
t=⌊cK⌋+1
2xt · e−xt/5 + 18σ
2
∆2i
e−∆
2
i ⌊xt⌋/18σ
2
≤
T∑
t=⌊cK⌋+1
(
2⌊cK⌋ − 2K + c ln
(
t
⌊cK⌋+ 1
))
·
(⌊cK⌋+ 1
t
)2
+
18σ2
∆2i
⌊cK⌋+ 1
t
≤ (⌊cK⌋ −K) · 2(⌊cK⌋+ 1)
2π2
3
+
(
c+
18σ2
∆2i
) T∑
t=⌊cK⌋+1
⌊cK⌋+ 1
t
≤ (⌊cK⌋ −K) · 2(⌊cK⌋+ 1)
2π2
3
+ (⌊cK⌋+ 1)
(
c+
18σ2
∆2i
)
ln
T
⌊cK⌋
(13)
The first inequality in the above holds because c ≥ max{20, 36σ2
∆2
i
}, and the second inequality is
based on the fact that lnx < x, ∀x > 1 and∑Tt=1 1t2 ≤ π23 . The last inequality is the implication of
Fact A.3. Moreover, utilizing Fact A.3, we bound
∑T
t=K+1
ǫt
K in the following way,
T∑
t=K+1
ǫt
K
=
⌊cK⌋∑
t=K+1
1
K
+
T∑
t=⌊cK⌋+1
ǫt
K
≤ ⌊cK⌋ −K
K
+ c ln
T
⌊cK⌋ , (14)
Combining Equations (10), (11), (12) and (14), we complete the proof.
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C Omitted Proofs in Section 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
We bound the terms in the decomposition of E[ni(T )] in Eq. (3) using Lemma C.1 – Lemma C.4.
Lemma C.1 (Lemma 2.16 in [2]). Let xi = µi +
∆i
3 and yi = µi∗ − ∆i3 ,
E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i, E
µ
i (t),E
θ
i (t)
}] ≤ 18 lnT
∆2i
+ 1
Lemma C.2 (Eq. (4) in [2]).
∑T
t=K+1 P
(
It = i, E
µ
i (t),E
θ
i (t)
) ≤∑T−1s=K+1 E [ 1pi,τi∗,s+1 − 1
]
Lemma C.3 (Extension of Lemma 2.13 in [2]). Let yi = µi∗ − ∆i3 ,
E
[
1
pi,τi∗,s+1
− 1
]
≤
{
e11/4σ
2
+ π
2
3 ∀s
4
T∆2
i
if s ≥ 72 ln(T∆2i )·max{1,σ2}
∆2
i
Proof. This lemma extends Lemma 2.13 in [2] to our setting, and we mainly emphasize the required
changes to the proof. Using the same notation as in [2], let Θj denote the Gaussian random variable
followsN (µ̂i∗(τj+1), 1j ), givenFτj . LetGj be the geometric random variable denoting the number
of consecutive independent trials until a sample of Θj becomes greater than yi. Let γ ≥ 1 be an
integer and z = 2σ
√
ln γ. Then we have E
[
1
pi,τj+1
− 1
]
= E[Gj ]. Following the same argument
proposed in [2], we have for any γ > e11/4σ
2
,
P(Gj < γ) ≥
(
1− 1
γ2
)
P
(
µ̂i∗ +
z√
j
≥ yi
)
For ni∗(t− 1) = j, Fτj , we have
P
(
µ̂i∗(τj + 1) +
z√
j
≥ yi
)
≥ P
(
µ̂i∗(τj + 1) +
z√
j
≥ µi∗
)
≥ 1− e− z
2
2σ2
= 1− e−4σ2 ln γ/2σ2 = 1−
(
1
γ
)2
Then P (Gj < γ) ≥ 1− 1γ2 − 1γ2 = 1− 2t2 . Therefore,
E[Gj ] =
T∑
γ=0
P(Gj ≥ γ) ≤ e11/4σ2 +
∑
γ≥1
2
t2
≤ e11/4σ2 + π
2
3
By the proof of Lemma 2.13 in [2], we have for anyDi(T ) ≥ 0,
E
[
1
pi,τj+1
− 1
]
≤ 1(
1− 12e−Di(T )∆
2
i
/72
) (
1− e−Di(T )∆2i/72σ2)
SinceDi(T ) =
72 ln(T∆2i )·max{1,σ
2}
∆2
i
, we have both 1− 12e−Di(T )∆
2
i/72 and 1− e−Di(T )∆2i/72σ2 are
larger than or equal to 1− 1
T∆2
i
. Thus, E
[
1
pi,τj+1
− 1
]
can be bounded by 4
T∆2
i
when j ≥ Di,T .
Lemma C.4.
E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i, E
µ
i (t)
}] ≤ max{6Bi
∆i
,
144σ2 lnT
∆2i
}
+ 1 (15)
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Proof. Let Ci(T ) = max
{
6Bi
∆i
, 144σ
2 lnT
∆2
i
}
. We first decompose the left hand side in Equation (15)
as below,
E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i, E
µ
i (t)
}] ≤ E[ T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i, E
µ
i (t), ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci(T )
}]
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i, E
µ
i (t), ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T )
}] (16)
The first term in the above decomposition is trivially bounded by ci(T ). What remains is to bound
second term
E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i, E
µ
i,t, ni(t− 1) ≥ ci(T )
}]
≤
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
Eµi,t, ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T )
)
≤
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
µ̂i,t−1 +
βt−1
ni(t− 1) ≥ xi
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T ))
≤
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
µ̂i,t−1 +
βt−1
ni(t− 1) ≥ xi
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T ))
By union bound, we have
P
(
µ̂i,t−1 +
βt−1
ni(t− 1) ≥ xi
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci(T ))
≤
t−1∑
s=ci(T )
P
(
µ̂i,t−1 +
Bi
ni(t− 1) ≥ xi
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = s)
≤
t−1∑
s=ci(T )
e−
s·(xi−µi−Bis )
2
2σ2 ≤
t−1∑
s=1
1
T 2
The last inequality above uses Fact (A.2) and the fact s ≥ ci(T ) ≥ 6Bi∆i and s ≥ 144σ
2 lnT
∆2
i
. Then the
second term of the right hand side in Equations 16 can be bounded by
∑T
t=K+1
∑t−1
s=1
1
T 2 ≤ 1.
D Omitted Proofs in Section 5
D.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1
As mentioned in Section 5, we show the lower bound of the regret by deriving the upper bound of
the expected number of times that arm i∗ being pulled, which is summarized in Lemma D.1. Given
Lemma D.1 and Eq. (5), it is straightforward to conclude Theorem 5.1.
Lemma D.1. Suppose each strategic arm i(i 6= i∗) uses LSI and ∆ = mini6=i∗ ∆i, the expected
number of times that optimal arm i∗ being pulled up to time T is bounded by,
E [ni∗(T )] ≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+O
(
lnT
∆2
)
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Proof. Let ∆ = mini6=i∗ ∆i, C(T ) =
36σ2 lnT
∆2
, Di =
Bi
2∆i
. First, by Fact A.2, we have for any
ℓ ≥ C(T ), s ≥ 1 and any i,
P
(
µi − µ̂i(t− 1) ≥ 3σ
√
ln t
ni(t− 1)
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = s
)
≤ 1
t9/2
P
(
µ̂i∗(t− 1)− µi∗ ≥ ∆i
2
∣∣∣ni∗(t− 1) = ℓ) ≤ exp(− ℓ∆2i
8σ2
)
≤ exp
(
−C(T )∆
2
i
8σ2
)
≤ 1
T 9/2
(17)
First, we decompose E [ni∗(T )] as follows,
E [ni∗,T ] ≤ 1 + E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≤ C(T )}
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≥ C(T )}
]
≤ 1 + E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≤ C(T )}
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≥ C(T ), ∀i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≥ Di}
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I (It = i
∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≥ C(T ), ∃i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≤ Di)
]
(18)
For the first term in the above decomposition, it can be trivially bounded by C(T ). For the second
term, since ni∗(t) ≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗ ni(t), ∀t, we have
E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≥ C(T ), ∀i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≥ Di}
]
≤ E
 T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗
Di}
 ≤ T −∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
What remains is to bound the third term in Equations (18). By union bound, we have
E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I (It = i
∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≥ C(T ), ∃i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≤ Di)
]
=
∑
i6=i∗
T∑
t=K+1
P (It = i
∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≥ C(T ), ni(t− 1) ≤ Di)
Note It = i
∗ implies UCBi∗(t) ≥ ÛCBi(t), combining the facts that 3σ
√
ln t
ni∗ (t−1)
≤ ∆/2 and
Bi
ni(t−1)
≥ 2∆i and standard union bound, we have
P (It = i
∗
, ni∗ (t− 1) ≥ C(T ), ni(t− 1) ≤ Di)
≤
Di∧t−1∑
s=1
t−1∑
ℓ≥C(T )
P
(
µ̂i∗ (t− 1) + 3σ
√
ln t
ni∗ (t− 1)
≥ UCBi(t) +
Bi
ni(t− 1)
∣∣∣ni∗(t− 1) = ℓ, ni(t− 1) = s)
≤
Di∧t−1∑
s=1
t−1∑
ℓ≥C(T )
P
(
µ̂i∗ (t− 1) +
∆i
2
≥ µ̂i(t− 1) + 3σ
√
ln t
ni(t− 1)
+ 2∆i,
∣∣∣ni∗(t− 1) = ℓ, ni(t− 1) = s
)
≤
Di∧t−1∑
s=1
t−1∑
ℓ≥C(T )
P
(
µ̂i∗ (t− 1)− µi∗ ≥
∆i
2
∣∣∣ni∗(t− 1) = ℓ)+ P(µi − µ̂i(t− 1) ≥ 3σ
√
ln t
ni(t− 1)
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) = s)
(19)
16
The last inequality is based on union bound, if both µ̂i∗(t− 1)− µi∗ < ∆/2 and µi − µ̂i(t− 1) <
3σ
√
ln t
ni(t−1)
hold when ni∗(t− 1) = ℓ, ni(t− 1) = s, then
µ̂i∗(t− 1) + ∆i
2
< µi∗ +
∆
2
+
∆i
2
≤ µi +∆i +∆i
< µ̂i(t− 1) + 3σ
√
ln t
ni(t− 1) + 2∆i
Given Equation (17), we have
P (It = i
∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≥ C(T ), ni(t− 1) ≤ Di) ≤
t−1∑
s=1
t−1∑
ℓ=1
2
t9/2
≤ 2
t2
Combining Equation (18), we get
E [ni∗(T )] ≤ 1 + C(T ) + T −
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+
∑
i6=i∗
T∑
t=K+1
2
t2
= T +
36σ2 lnT
∆2
−
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+ 1 +
(K − 1)π2
3
D.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Analogous to Theorem 5.1, we derive the upper bound of E[ni∗(T )] when all strategic arms use LSI
manipulation strategy in Lemma D.2.
Lemma D.2. ∀t > K , let ǫt = min{1, cKt }, where a constant c = max
{
20, 16σ
2
∆2
k
, ∀k ∈ [K]
}
, Bi
be the total budget for strategic arm. The expected number of plays of arm i∗ up to time T , if all
strategic arms use LSI, is bounded by
E [ni∗(T )] ≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+O
(
lnT
∆2
)
Proof. Let Ci =
Bi
2∆i
, xt =
1
2K
∑t
s=K+1 ǫs and for t ≥ ⌊cK⌋+ 1, by Equation (9) xt ≥ ⌊cK⌋ −
K + c2 ln
t
⌊cK⌋+1 .
We first bound the probability of P
(
µ̂i∗(t− 1) ≥ µ˜i(t− 1)
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci) for t ≥ K + 1,
P
(
µ̂i∗(t− 1) ≥ µ˜i(t− 1), ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci
)
= P
(
µ̂i∗(t− 1) ≥ µ̂i(t− 1) + Bi
ni(t− 1) , ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci
)
≤ P
(
µ̂i∗(t− 1) ≥ µ̂i(t− 1) + 2∆i
)
≤ P
(
µ̂i∗(t− 1) ≥ µi∗ + ∆i
2
)
+ P
(
µ̂i(t− 1) ≤ µi − ∆i
2
)
≤ 2xt · e−xt/5 + 8σ
2
∆2i
e−∆
2
i ⌊xt⌋/8σ
2
(By Lemma A.5)
(20)
We can decompose the expected number of plays of the optimal arm i, E[ni∗,T ], as follows,
E [ni∗(T )] = 1 + E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ∀i 6= i∗ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci}
]
+ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ∃i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci}
] (21)
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The first term in the above decomposition can be bounded by T −∑i6=i∗ Ci. This is because
E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i
∗, ∀i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≥ Ci
}]
≤ E
 T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i
∗, ni∗(t− 1) ≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗
Ci
} ≤ T −∑
i6=i∗
Ci.
By union bound, the second term is bounded by
∑
i6=i∗ E
[∑T
t=K+1 I{It = i∗, ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci}
]
.
Then, we bound the above summand using Equations (20) and the fact that 1 − ǫt = 0 when
t ≤ ⌊cK⌋,
E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I{It = i∗, ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci}
]
≤
T∑
t=K+1
ǫt
K
+
T∑
t=K+1
(1− ǫt) · P
(
µ̂i∗(t− 1) ≥ µ˜i(t− 1), ni(t− 1) ≤ Ci
)
≤
T∑
t=K+1
ǫt
K
+
T∑
t=⌊cK⌋+1
2xt · e−xt/5 + 8σ
2
∆2i
e−∆
2
i ⌊xt⌋/8σ
2
(22)
What remains is to bound the last term in the above equations. Following the same arguments and
proof procedure in Equations (13), we can bound
T∑
t=⌊cK⌋+1
2xt · e−xt/5 + 8σ
2
∆2i
e−∆
2
i⌊xt⌋/8σ
2
≤ (⌊cK⌋ −K) · 2(⌊cK⌋+ 1)
2π2
3
+ (⌊cK⌋+ 1)
(
c+
8σ2
∆2i
)
ln
T
⌊cK⌋
(23)
By Eq. (14), we have
E[ni∗(T )] ≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+
⌊cK⌋
K
+ c ln
T
⌊cK⌋
+
∑
i6=i∗
(
(⌊cK⌋ −K) · 2(⌊cK⌋+ 1)
2π2
3
+ (⌊cK⌋+ 1)
(
c+
8σ2
∆2i
)
ln
T
⌊cK⌋
)
≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+O
(
lnT
∆2
)
D.3 Proof of Theorem 5.3
To prove Theorem 5.3, we follow the same approach as for UCB/ε−Greedy algorithms. In particular,
we instead prove the upper bound of E[ni∗(T )], shown in Theorem D.3. Given this Theorem, our
main theorem in this section (Theorem 5.3) is straightforward. Here we slightly abuse notations,
and use Eµi∗(t) to denote the event that µ̂i∗(t − 1) ≤ vi whereas Eθi∗(t) to denote the event that
θi∗(t) ≤ wi, where µi∗ < vi < wi.
Theorem D.3.
E[ni∗(T )] ≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+O
(
lnT
∆2
)
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Proof. We decompose the expected number of plays of the optimal arm i∗ as follows,
E[ni∗(T )] ≤ 1 +
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eµi∗(t)
)
+
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
)
+
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
)
Then we bound each of the above terms. Lemma D.4, D.5 and D.8 show the upper bound of each
term and complete the proof.
Lemma D.4. Let vi = µi∗ +
∆i
3 ,
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eµi∗(t)
)
≤ 18σ
2
∆2i
Proof. Following the proof of Lemma 2.11 in [2], we have
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eµi∗(t)
)
≤
T−1∑
s=1
P
(
Eµi∗(τi∗,s+1)
)
=
T−1∑
s=1
P (µ̂i∗(τi∗,s+1) > vi)
≤
T−1∑
s=1
exp
(
−s(vi − µi∗)
2
2σ2
)
≤ 2σ
2
(vi − µi∗)2
The first inequality holds because each summand on the right hand side in this inequality is a fixed
number since the distribution of µ̂i∗(τi∗,s+1) only depends on s. The second inequality is based on
Fact A.4 and the third inequality goes through because
∑∞
k=1 e
−kx ≤ 1x , ∀x > 0.
Notice that Lemma C.2 holds independently with the identity of the arm. Then the following Lemma
can be directly implied.
Lemma D.5. Let vi = µi∗ +
∆i
3 and wi = µi∗ +
2∆i
3
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
)
≤ 18 lnT
∆2i
+ 1
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2.16 in [2] can be directly applied here by regarding arm i∗ as a standard
sub-optimal arm i.
What remains is to bound
∑T
t=K+1 P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
)
. To this end, we show some auxiliary
lemmas in the following. Lemma D.6 mimics Lemma 2.8 in [2], which bridges the probability that
arm i∗ will be pulled and the probability that arm i will be pulled at time t. Lemma D.7 bounds the
term E
[
1
qi,τi,s+1
− 1
]
by a reduction to the case shown in Lemma C.2.
Lemma D.6. For any instantiation Ft−1 of Ft−1, let qi,t := P
(
θi(t) > wi
∣∣∣Ft−1), we have
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
∣∣∣Ft−1) ≤ 1− qi,t
qi,t
P
(
It = i, E
θ
i∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
∣∣∣Ft−1)
Proof. Since Eµi∗(t) is only determined by the instantiation Ft−1 of Ft−1, we can assume event
Eµi∗(t) is true without loss of generality. Then, it is sufficient to show that for any Ft−1 we have
P
(
It = i
∗
∣∣∣Eθi∗(t), Ft−1) ≤ 1− qi,tqi,t P
(
It = i,
∣∣∣Eθi∗(t), Ft−1)
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Note, givenEθi∗(t), It = i
∗ implies θj(t) ≤ wi, ∀j, meanwhile, θi(t) is independent with θj(t), j 6=
i, given Ft−1 = Ft−1. Therefore, we have
P
(
It = i
∗
∣∣∣Eθi∗(t), Ft−1) ≤ P(θj(t) ≤ wi, ∀j∣∣∣Eθi∗(t), Ft−1)
= P
(
θi(t) ≤ wi
∣∣∣Ft−1) · P(θj(t) ≤ wi, ∀j 6= i∣∣∣Eθi∗(t), Ft−1)
On the other side,
P
(
It = i
∣∣∣Eθi∗(t), Ft−1) ≥ P(θi(t) > wi ≥ θj(t), ∀j 6= i∣∣∣Eθi∗(t), Ft−1)
= P
(
θi(t) > wi
∣∣∣Ft−1) · P(θj(t) ≤ wi, ∀j 6= i∣∣∣Eθi∗(t), Ft−1)
Thus, the above two inequalities implies the correctness of the Lemma.
Lemma D.7. Let wi = µi∗ +
2∆i
3 . For any s ≥ 1, given ni(τi,s) ≤ Bi2∆i , we have
E
[
1
qi,τi,s+1
− 1
∣∣∣ni(τi,s) ≤ Bi
2∆i
]
≤
{
e11/4σ
2
+ π
2
3 ∀s
1
T∆i
if s ≥ Li(T )
where Li(T ) =
72 ln(T∆2i )·max{1,σ
2}
∆2
i
.
Proof. We prove this Lemma by a reduction to Lemma C.3. First, we observe θi(τi,s + 1) ∼
N
(
µ˜i(τi,s),
1
ni(τi,s)
)
, where µ˜i(τi,s) = µ̂i(τi,s) +
Bi
ni(τi,s)
. Given ni(τi,s) ≤ Bi∆i , we have
µ˜i(τi,s) ≥ µ̂i(τi,s) + 2∆i. Let ζi(τi,s + 1) denote the random variable of Gaussian distribution
N
(
µ̂i(τi,s),
1
ni(τi,s)
)
. By the fact that a Gaussian random variable a ∼ N (m,σ2) is stochastically
dominated by any b ∼ N (m′, σ2) whenm < m′, we have for any Ft−1 of Ft−1
qi,τi,s+1 = P
(
θi(τi,s + 1) > wi
∣∣∣Ft−1) ≥ P(ζi(τi,s + 1) + 2∆i > wi∣∣∣Ft−1)
= P
(
ζi(τi,s + 1) > µi − ∆i
3
∣∣∣Ft−1) := ηi,τi,s+1
Therefore, E
[
1
qi,τi,s+1
− 1
]
≤ E
[
1
ηi,τi,s+1
− 1
]
. Denote ui := µi − ∆i3 . Recall
pi,τi,s+1 = P
(
θi∗(τi∗,s + 1) > µi∗ − ∆i
3
∣∣∣Ft−1) ,
we observe ηi,τi,s+1 is analogous to pi,τi,s+1 in formula, when we replace µi and µ̂i(τi,s + 1) by
µi∗ and µ̂i∗(τi∗,s + 1) respectively (i.e. change arm i by i
∗). Recall the proof in Lemma C.2, it
only depends on the relationship between yi = µi∗ − ∆i3 and µi∗ , which is the same as ui and µi in
ηi,τi,s+1. Thus, the proof of Lemma C.2 can be directly applied here to boundE
[
1
ηi,τi,s+1
− 1
]
.
Lemma D.8.
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
)
≤ T −
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+
∑
i6=i∗
((
e11/4σ
2
+
π2
3
) · 72 ln(T∆2i ) ·max{1, σ2}
∆2i
+
4
∆2i
)
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Proof. We first decompose the target term by thresholding ni(t− 1) as follows,
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
)
≤ E
[
T∑
t=K+1
I
{
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t), ∀i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≥
Bi
2∆i
}]
+
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t), ∃i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≤
Bi
2∆i
)
(24)
For the first term in above decomposition, it can be trivially upper bounded by T −∑i6=i∗ Bi2∆i . By
union bound and Lemma D.6, we can bound the second term as follows,
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t), ∃i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≤
Bi
2∆i
)
≤
∑
i6=i∗
T∑
t=K+1
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t), ∃i 6= i∗, ni(t− 1) ≤
Bi
2∆i
)
=
∑
i6=i∗
T∑
t=K+1
E
[
P
(
It = i
∗, Eθi∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t), ni(t− 1) ≤
Bi
2∆i
∣∣∣Ft−1)]
=
∑
i6=i∗
T∑
t=K+1
E
[
1− qi,t
qi,t
· P
(
It = i, E
θ
i∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t), ni(t− 1) ≤
Bi
2∆i
∣∣∣Ft−1)]
≤
∑
i6=i∗
T∑
t=K+1
E
[
1− qi,t
qi,t
· P
(
It = i, E
θ
i∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
∣∣∣ni(t− 1) ≤ Bi
2∆i
,Ft−1
)]
=
∑
i6=i∗
T∑
t=K+1
E
[
1− qi,t
qi,t
· I
{
It = i, E
θ
i∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
}∣∣∣ni(t− 1) ≤ Bi
2∆i
]
Observe that qi,t = P
(
θi(t) > wi
∣∣∣Ft−1) changes only at the time step after each pull of arm i.
Therefore we can bound the above term by,
T−1∑
s=1
E
1− qi,τi,s+1
qi,τi,s+1
·
τi,s+1∑
t=τi,s+1
I
{
It = i, E
θ
i∗(t), E
µ
i∗(t)
}∣∣∣ni(τi,s) ≤ Bi
2∆i

≤
T−1∑
s=1
E
[
1− qi,τi,s+1
qi,τi,s+1
∣∣∣ni(τi,s) ≤ Bi
2∆i
]
Combining Lemma D.7 and Equation (24), we complete the proof.
D.4 Proof of Theorem 5.4
To prove Theorem 5.4, we first show the following Lemma.
Lemma D.9. Suppose all the strategic arms use LSIBR, and let time step n be the last time that
a strategic arm spend budget for some n ≤ T . Then if principal agent runs UCB or ε-Greedy or
Thompson Sampling, the expected number of plays of the optimal arm i∗ from time n + 1 to T is
bounded by,
E
[
T∑
t=n+1
I
{
It = i
∗
}] ≤ T −∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+O
(
lnT
∆2
)
.
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Proof. The proof follows a simple reduction to the setting with arms using LSI. By using LSIBR,
any strategic arm i has no budget to manipulate after (includes) time step n+ 1, which is analogous
to the case that arm i has no budget to manipulate after timeK + 1 using LSI in unbounded reward
setting. Then after time n + 1, the µ˜i(t − 1) = µ̂i(t − 1) + Bini(t−1) , ∀ ∈ [K], which shares
the same formula with it in LSI setting. Finally, we notice that the proofs of the upper bounds of
E
[∑T
t=K+1 I{It = i∗}
]
in LSI settings (Lemma D.1, D.2 and Theorem D.3) don’t depend on the
starting time step in the summand. Therefore, the proofs in these previous results can be directly
applied here.
Next, we prove Theorem 5.4 using the above Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Let n be the last time step that any arm can spend the budget. First we show
the upper bound of E [nLSIBRi∗ (T )]. Note, from time 1 to n−1, any strategic arm i always promote its
reward to 1, which makes arm i the "optimal arm" from time 1 to n (the arm selection at time n only
depends on previous feedback). Then following the standard analysis in stochastic MAB alogrithms
(UCB, ε-Greedy and Thompson Sampling), E [nLSIBRi∗ (n)] ≤ O
(
lnn
(1−µi∗ )2
)
. Thus, E [nLSIBRi∗ (T )] can
be bounded by,
E
[
nLSIBRi∗ (T )
] ≤ T −∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
+O
(
lnT
∆2
+
lnn
(1− µi∗)2
)
.
Consequently, we can show the lower bound of regret when all strategic arms use LSIBR, as follows
E [R(T )] ≥ ∆
∑
i6=i∗
Bi
2∆i
−O
(
lnT
∆
+
∆ lnT
(1− µi∗)2
)
.
E Additional Simulations
We report our simulation results for bounded rewards in this section. Similarly, we also consider
a stochastic bandit setting with three arms. The reward of each arm lies within the interval [0, 1].
The distributions of rewards of each arm are Beta(1, 1), Beta(2, 1) and Beta(3, 1) respectively. In
ε-Greedy algorithm, we use a different εt parameter, i.e. εt = min{1, 20t }. We run simulations
for the same settings as those in Section 6 and report the results in Figure 3 and 4. These figures
illustrate similar performances for bounded rewards as for unbounded rewards.
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Figure 3: [0, 1] bounded rewards: plots of regret with ln t for UCB principal (left), ε-Greedy principal (middle),
and Thompson Sampling principal (right), as B1 and B2 vary. We set B3 = 0 for the three algorithms.
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Figure 4: [0, 1] bounded rewards: plots of regret with total budget B of strategic arms (arm 1 and 2) for UCB
principal (left), ε-Greedy principal (middle), and Thompson Sampling principal (right), as Bi varies.
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